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Abstract 
This essay outlines three geographical problem-spaces illuminated by 
Nietzsche.  The first is Nietzsche’s counterpoint to the ‘real world’: the ‘apparent 
world’.  The second is a non-totalizing, political elaboration of the first, what 
Deleuze once called “the local fires of Heraclitus.”  The third, Europe, is a space 
that Nietzsche wrote from and against, a space best approached through a 
postcolonial, transcritical reading. 
And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? … The world: a 
monster of energy, without beginning, without end… a play of forces 
and waves of forces. (Nietzsche, 1968 [1885], 549) 
 If to be a geographer means that one studies and writes of the world, then 
Nietzsche could be seen as one of the great geographers, although his tools for 
writing – hammer, typewriter, genealogy, destruction – are either missing or often 
misunderstood.2  Yet I do not intend to fend for a specifically Nietzschean 
geography.  Given the debts to Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault, one might 
                                                 
1   Creative Commons licence: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 
2 Twilight of the idols is subtitled, “how to philosophize with a hammer”.  Nietzsche explains this subtitle with 
the answer: by tapping upon idols (or ideals).  Nietzsche was the first philosopher to use a typewriter 
(Wershler-Henry 2005, 50-51).  Nietzsche’s typewriter has not been located.  Nietzsche’s genealogy and 
destruction are not as well known to geographers today as Foucault’s ‘genealogy’ and Derrida’s 
‘deconstruction’, but the latter are marked fundamentally by, and would not have been possible without, the 
former.  Derrida attributed to Nietzsche the tradition of the critique of metaphysics; Heidegger claimed that 
Nietzsche merely encircled it, but failed to escape metaphysics (see 1979 [1961]). 
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reasonably argue that the fruits of Nietzschean geographical thinking are bearing in 
what is often called ‘poststructuralist geography’.3  Any effort to demarcate a 
properly Nietzschean geography within this field would be undermined by 
Nietzsche’s thought, which is rigorously anti-systematic and anti-disciplinary.  So, 
without defining boundaries, we may avow that Nietzsche has lessons to teach us – 
albeit not as Geographers, but as thinkers of geographical problems.4  In this spirit, 
my essay gestures to three problem-spaces illuminated by Nietzsche’s texts.  By 
this I refer to spaces defined by problems that solicit thought.  These spaces do not 
appear on any map of the real world – indeed, they oppose the real world. 
 Before proceeding, one fundamental qualification.  Staying within the strict 
limits of this assignment, my treatment of these three problem-spaces proceeds 
with reference to only a few passages from Nietzsche’s considerable opus.  It is 
enormously hazardous to build philosophical claims upon such a narrow base, but 
especially for Nietzsche: the brilliant, epigrammatic clarity of his writing stands in 
stark contrast to the haziness shrouding the totality of his thought.  I make no claim 
that these remarks represent anything of this totality.  On the contrary.  Indeed, I 
can find no such thing; or, insofar as it exists, it is contradictory, anti-systematic, 
and anti-totalizing.  Consider one of Nietzsche’s “maxims and arrows” from 
Twilight of the Idols: “I mistrust all systemetizers and avoid them.  The will to a 
system is a lack of integrity” (1990 [1888a], 35).  Nietzschean integrity, or rigor, is 
a sort that solicits thought that undoes itself.5 
The apparent world 
Let us abolish the real world. (Nietzsche, 1967 [1888b], 254) 
Geography constitutes itself as the study of, and writing of, the world.  Very 
well: but which world?  The real one, of course, just as it is.  And how do we study 
it?  By the application of reason. 
 Put in these terms, Nietzsche’s importance for geographical thought lies in 
that his texts violently call into question these basic disciplinary conceptions.  
Nietzsche’s texts unsettle these foundations like no other.  Their importance lies in 
the way that they “cut away the grounds of knowing” (Spivak, 1976, l).  If the word 
were not already structurally tainted in geography, we could say that Nietzsche’s 
‘method’ for accomplishing this cutting-away is to call into question the value of 
inherited truths.  As we read in On the Genealogy of Morals: “The will to truth 
requires a critique – let us thus define our own task – the value of this truth must 
                                                 
3 Regarding Nietzsche’s influence on poststructuralism, see Schrift (1995). 
4 I borrow here Walter Kaufman’s characterization of Nietzsche, “not a system-thinker but a problem-thinker” 
(1950, 68). 
5 Paul de Man calls Nietzsche’s “allegory of errors … the very model of philosophical rigor” (1979, 118).  For 
a critique, see Waite (1983).   
ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 2010, 9 (1), 21-33 23 
for once be experimentally called into question” (1967 [1887], 153).  Here we can 
discern the debt of Foucault’s genealogy to Nietzsche. 
 And we can begin to see what is at stake in Nietzsche’s claim that the 
“‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been lyingly added…” 
(1990 [1888a], 46).  For geographers one particular ground matters above all: the 
ground that we really know the truth of the real world.  Because, again, geography 
constitutes itself as the study of the world – an object, real and true.  The task of 
‘calling into question’ the truth of the real world – that is, the truth of the world as 
real, external, object – this task, a central one of the present generation of human 
geographers, was demarcated quite precisely by Nietzsche in the 1880s.  
Nietzsche’s texts – particularly those of 1886-8 – aim at destroying Christian 
platitudes about God’s truth and creation and their object equivalent, ‘the real 
world’.6 
In calling into question the truth of the real world Nietzsche is often 
misunderstood as ‘denying reality’ in the sense of refusing to accept the world as it 
is.  But Nietzsche was no mere refuser; indeed his “formula for greatness” was 
“amor fati,” love of fate, the embrace of the chance of necessity (1967 [1888b], 
258).7  His calling into question the truth of the real world is instead a demand for 
agonistic inquiry into the value of the truth of the real world.  His texts demand: 
exactly what is the value of our aprioristic insistence on the reality-truth of the real 
world?  This question compels us to engage with the world as it actually is: 
apparent, forceful, ensconced in values.  Nietzsche writes: “The ‘true world’ and 
the ‘apparent world’ – that means: the mendaciously invented world and reality” 
(1967 [1888b], 218).8  This is no denial of worldly existence.  It is a call to return to 
it, albeit without any of the guarantees that we associate with the concept of the 
‘real world.’  Edward Said once wrote that “Nietzsche saw human history as a 
battle of interpretations” and that his genealogy of morals was about grasping this 
battle (2002 [1976],73).  To this we might add that Nietzsche’s apparent world is 
                                                 
6 While we may think Nietzsche’s destructive criticism as pure affirmation, we should not see it as affirmation 
of the status quo.  In Nietzsche and philosophy Deleuze writes: “The sense of Nietzsche’s philosophy is that 
multiplicity, becoming and chance are objects of pure affirmation. … Affirmation remains as the sole quality of 
the will to power, action as the sole quality of force, becoming-active as the creative identity of power and 
willing” (1983 [1962], 197-8).  See also Karatani (2003, 123).  There is a close relation between Deleuze’s 
reading of Nietzsche with Derrida’s (1982 [1968]) celebration of “Nietzsche’s affirmations.”  Yet Derrida’s 
Nietzsche-affirmation, unlike Deleuze’s, is paired with “Heideggerian hope.”  I am inclined toward Derrida’s 
tone, which is more faithful to Nietzsche’s, and does not align hope with immanence.  Note also that, in his 
brutal critique of Christianity’s contribution to the ‘so-called reality of the real world’, Nietzsche anticipated 
Gramsci (1959). 
7 “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different […].  Not 
merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is 
necessary – but love it” (Nietzsche, 1967 [1888b], 258). 
8 In Deleuze’s reading, Nietzsche displaces the truth of the real world to offer a philosophy of values, forces, 
and senses.  This clarifies the meaning of Nietzsche’s substitution of the ‘real world’ for the ‘apparent world’, 
as Nietzsche once defined ‘apparent world’ as “a world viewed according to values” (1967 [1888b], 305). 
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likewise an outcome of these battles, and therefore the world itself, geography, may 
be studied genealogically.9   
 Local fires 
 Though famously immodest, Nietzsche attributes his critique of the real 
world to another thinker: Heraclitus. 
In so far as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they 
do not lie....  But Heraclitus will always be right in this, that being is 
an empty fiction.  The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ 
world has only been lyingly added… (1990 [1888a], 46) 
Among the many difficulties with thinking through this itinerary is the fact that we 
know almost nothing about Heraclitus.  Heraclitus, sometimes known as ‘the 
obscure’ for the enigmatic qualities of his thought, is said to be from Ephesus and 
to have lived around 500 BC.  Heraclitus wrote only one book, which may have 
been called On Nature,10 of which we have no extant copy.  Our knowledge of it is 
based mainly on a collection of fragments that have been compiled from the 
writings of other thinkers, mainly Greeks like Socrates who cited Heraclitus to 
argue against him.  These fragments are famously difficult to translate (see 
Heidegger 1975 [1954]; Heidegger and Fink 1993 [1967]; Khan (1979); Gadamer 
2001 [1999]).  Nevertheless, since the Enlightenment a few of the greatest 
European philosophers have found in Heraclitus a model of philosophical rigor: 
Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular, but also Hegel.11 
Today Heraclitus is best known for one of these fragments, a single geo-
philosopheme that has floated down to us though the ages.  In his Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy, Hegel relates it thus: “Plato further says of Heraclitus: ‘He 
compares things to the current of a river: no one can go twice into the same 
stream,’ for as it flows on an other water is disturbed” (1892, 283).12  Why has this 
comment about the inability to step into the same river twice lasted for 2,500 years 
– as long or longer, that is, than any other thought in the Western philosophical 
tradition?  What does this say about our tradition?  This may seem like a frivolous 
                                                 
9 For Nietzsche’s critique of the real world, see also passages 5, 9, and 19 from Human, All Too Human, 
section I; Nietzsche’s miniature genealogy in Twilight of the Idols, “How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a 
Myth: History of an Error”; and fragments 461; 470; 520-1; 567-70; 583-85; 600-2; 708; 796; and 1066-1067 
of The Will to Power (1968 [1885]). 
10 In some accounts, Heraclitus’ text concerned not nature but the state: see Gadamer (2001 [1999],  22; 42-3). 
11 In his discussion of pre-Socratic Greek philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel writes 
of Heraclitus: “Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic”  
(1892, 279). 
12 Gadamer (2001 [1999]) characterizes Heraclitus’ famous river as “an example of the unity of oppositions… 
The example of the river works best here in terms of the unity of the course of the river and the restlessness of 
its flow.  The mysterious problem that shows itself behind all of these oppositions is apparently the fact that 
what is the same show itself as an other with no transition” (39). 
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question – but this would only be because the thought expressed by this 
philosopheme (“no one can go twice into the same stream”) seems ridiculous to us 
today.  Because of course we can step into a stream, in and out, just as we please, 
in this real world. 
A reply cannot be found in Heraclitus’ fragments.  But we may answer by 
turning to Nietzsche’s text, specifically where the value of the truth of the real 
world is questioned.  Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return repeats differently 
Heraclitus’s doctrine of non-dialectical opposition.13  (Compare, for instance, 
Zarathustra’s “go down to rise” with Heraclitus’s saying: “The way upward and 
downward are one and the same.”14)  On this basis we may begin to interpret 
Nietzsche’s attribution of his critique of the real world from Heraclitus.  Although 
none of the fragments of Heraclitus say the words that Nietzsche attributes to 
Heraclitus, we can find in fragment 30 something of Nietzsche’s ‘apparent world’: 
This world, the same for all, neither any of the gods nor any man has 
made, but it always was, and is, and shall be, an ever living fire, 
kindled in due measure, and in due measure extinguished.15 
The world always was, and is, and shall be, an ever living fire: here becoming and 
the eternal return are materialized.  They are not cast in stone, but materialize 
instead as energetic process, fire: pure becoming, the constant conversion of matter 
and energy.  Fire which destroys and creates.  With Heraclitus, Nietzsche asks us to 
think the shape and form of the ‘apparent world’ as a strange world-fire: “a 
monster of energy, without beginning, without end…” (Nietzsche 1968 [1885], 
                                                 
13 In Ecce Homo we read: “Before me […] tragic wisdom was lacking; I have looked in vain for signs of it even 
among the great Greeks, those of two centuries before Socrates.  I retained some doubt in the case of 
Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel warmer and better than anywhere else.  The affirmation of passing away 
and destroying, which is the decisive feature of Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; 
becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of being – all this is clearly more closely related 
to me than anything else thought to date.  The doctrine of the ‘eternal recurrence,’ that is, of the unconditional 
and infinitely repeated circular course of all things – this doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been 
taught already by Heraclitus” (Nietzsche, 1967 [1888b], 273-274).  
14 Fragment 69 reads:  Ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή.  There are two sources.  The first is Hippolytus, Ref. 
haer. ix. 10. “Up and down he [Heraclitus] says are one and the same.”  Also, Diogenes Laert. ix. 8.  
“Heraclitus says that change is the road leading upward and downward, and that the whole world exists 
according to it.” 
15 Heraclitus, 1889: Κόσμον <τόνδε> τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων οὔτε τις  θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, ἀλλ' 
ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.  There are at least 
two sources for this fragment.  First: Clement of Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 711. Context: “Heraclitus of Ephesus is 
very plainly of this opinion, since he recognizes that there is an everlasting world on the one hand and on the 
other a perishable, that is, in its arrangement, knowing that in a certain manner the one is not different from the 
other. But that he knew an everlasting world eternally of a certain kind in its whole essence, he makes plain, 
saying in this manner, ‘This world the same for all,’ etc.”  Second: Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 5, p. 1014. 
Context: “This world, says Heraclitus, neither any god nor man has made; as if fearing that having denied a 
divine creation, we should suppose the creator of the world to have been some man.”  
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550).  Reading this same fragment by Heraclitus, Heidegger writes: “World is 
enduring fire, enduring rising….” (1975 [1954], p. 117).16 
 But here we should take care to read Nietzsche and Heidegger otherwise, 
toward another politics.  Deleuze reads Heraclitus’ fire as a figure for a non-
totalizing anti-imperial political theory: “The revolutionary response to American 
world politics,” Deleuze writes, “… is four or five Vietnams” (2004 [1970], 159).  
(The allusion is to Che Guevara’s dictum that what was needed to bring down US 
imperialism was “many Vietnams.”17)  He elaborates on the task of thinking with 
Heraclitus as a “strategist, combat philosopher”: 
Heraclitus says that all things become fire, but is precisely not 
thinking of a universal conflagration, which he leaves unthought as 
the nothing of nihilism, showing nihilism necessarily self-overcome 
or overcome by what is thought in it, in the local fires that unite the 
peoples of the earth. (Deleuze, 2004 [1970], 159) 
What do we learn from Deleuze’s reading of Heraclitus as a “combat philosopher”?  
The world is “the same for all” – but this is no simple nod toward the unity of the 
real world.  Not at all.  The world is the same for all as the ‘apparent world’, one of 
perpetual flux and (if we can think this word today apart from its conception as a 
scale) local fires.   
 So perhaps we have never had geophilosophy at all, but rather 
pyrophilosophy.18  Neither ‘the real world’, nor imminent materialism, but world – 
burning, becoming, Dionysian.  Within the apparent world, one seeks not being, 
nor one fire, but instead a pyrophilosophy of local fires through which world 
endures.19 
 In the light of the stars and the flames of local fires dance figures of the 
affirmation of irrecuperable difference. 
                                                 
16 Heraclitus’ pyrophilosophy may be appropriated into Christian metaphysics (a world of potential hell-fire) 
but his thought resists this: see Gadamer, 2001 [1999], 28-29, 71-3. 
17 “How close and bright would the future appear if two, three, many Vietnams flowered on the face of the 
globe […] with their repeated blows against imperialism, forcing it to disperse its forces under the lash of the 
growing hatred of the peoples of the world!” (Guevara, 1967). 
18 This reference is to Deleuze and Guattari’s “Geophilosophy” (1994).  Arun Saldana (2006) characterizes 
Deleuzoguattarian space as “one of differences leading to the individuation of systems; of flows forming 
networks of state and capitalist power; of territories made up from mobilities that exceed them; of desiring-
machines that are necessary for the enduring relations of inequality.”  The light of the fire of Heraclitus glows 
here. 
19 This reiterates an earlier citation of Heidegger on Heraclitus: “world is enduring fire, enduring rising” (1975 
[1954], 117). 
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Europe 
Nietzsche scrutinized the way of being a free subject in the practical 
sense. His thoughts have nothing to do with affirmation of status quo. 
And his ‘will to power’ is attained by bracketing the determination of 
causality; nevertheless what he forgot was the need to see the world 
by unbracketing it now and then. (Kojin Karatani, 2003, 123) 
 Today any responsible discussion of Nietzsche and geography requires 
thought – perhaps the sort executed with a hammer – of the concept-space, 
‘Europe’.  If Spivak is correct to say that Nietzsche and Freud, more than any other 
European thinkers, called into question the structural distinction between the ideal 
and the material (1976, 105), then we must add that they did not do so in a way that 
attended to the becoming-space of this task.  On the contrary.20 
Earlier I noted that Nietzsche attributed his inspiration for the destruction of 
the real world to one ‘Heraclitus of Ephesus’.  But where is Ephesus?  Today 
Ephesus is known as Efes, a town in the territory of the modern nation-state of 
Turkey.  Here one can visit the very river where Heraclitus is supposed to have 
been inspired to make his famous statement about the stepping in the flux of things.  
The banks of the River Meander (from which we geographers obtain the verb ‘to 
meander’) are protected by a park that memorializes Heraclitus.  If we were to visit 
this riverbank, where would we be?  In Europe?  Is Turkey European? 
Let us suppose the answer to both questions is no: that despite the best 
attempts of the Turkish state to change this condition, let us say that Turkey is not 
European (after all, ‘Anatolia’ is itself a name for this land – from the Greek – that 
means ‘east of Greece’).  Then the River Meander, Büyük Menderes, flows 
westward into the Aegean Sea, but from the East, not-Europe.  What then of 
Heraclitus’ doctrine about being, inspired by this famously impermanent stream?  
Is it no longer cherished pre-Socratic ground for Western philosophy?  Was I 
wrong to write above that Heraclitus’ fragment about the inability to step into the 
same river twice is older than any other thought in the Western philosophical 
tradition? 
 Asking such questions clarifies the impossibility of discerning and settling 
such questions on the basis of geographical boundaries.  What matters here is not 
the elusive dividing line between Europe and not-Europe, but the productive flow 
of Büyük Menderes that spaces Europe.  Büyük Menderes meanders as a border 
problem for Europe’s very thought of European thought.  Just as we cannot step in 
the same river twice, we cannot orient ourselves to ‘Western thought’ by the flux of 
                                                 
20 It is curious that Spivak left Marx off this list, since his theory of value in Capital ruptures the distinction 
between the ideal and the material. 
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the River Meander – nor any other geographical object in the ‘real world’.  The 
legendary impermanence of Büyük Menderes only conforms to this river’s spacing 
(of) an instable world that resists division.21 
In her preface to Of Grammatology (1976), Spivak locates Derrida’s text as 
a thread of the social text of the ‘philosophers of difference’ that includes Deleuze, 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Heraclitus.  To read Nietzsche geographically 
is to inherit this tradition’s critique of the real world.  But it is also to undo the very 
thought that such a tradition is of or for the West, European.  To say this 
differently: the problem of Europe – the fact that it is violently reproduced through 
an essentially imperial division of the world (Said 1978; Wainwright 2005) – 
means that our reading of Nietzsche (and Heraclitus) should be postcolonial.  
A postcolonial reading clarifies two crucial guidelines for reading 
Nietzsche.  First: notwithstanding the facts that (a) Nietzsche hated Germanophilia, 
nationalism, and state power; (b) Nietzsche’s sister abused Nietzsche’s texts to put 
them to work for the Nazi party; (c) the pragmatism that asks only of a philosopher, 
‘and what was your voting record?’ is a thoughtless and anti-leftist protocol – 
notwithstanding these three facts, we must still insist there is no point in trying to 
deny or hide the connection between Nietzsche and Nazism.  This is to reiterate 
Spivak: 
[A]s Derrida has argued about Nietzsche and Nazism, it is futile to 
excuse away the connections between the texts of Marx and the 
possibility of reading them so as to support totalitarianism or 
modernization.  No possible reading is a mis-reading.  The spirit of 
refutation and de-fetishization is a homo-erotic adventure that simply 
gives the game to the best arguer, the best manipulator of power.  
The challenge of deconstruction is not to excuse [Marx, Nietzsche, or 
anyone else], but to suspend accusation to examine with painstaking 
care if the protocols of the text contains a moment that can produce 
something that will generate a new and useful reading. (1999, 98) 
This essay cannot examine the texts of Nietzsche with such care.  Yet it may 
indicate why doing so is necessary. 
A second postcolonial guideline for reading Nietzsche: it is futile to deny 
the connections between the texts of Nietzsche and the production of European 
philosophy as a self-narrating, and exclusionary, disciplinary tradition.  One must 
out-Nietzsche Nietzsche at the task of destroying metaphysics qua European 
                                                 
21 Büyük Menderes is not alone in having these qualities.  There is nothing essential about it.  Heraclitus’ 
thought is not dependent on a particular river.  Nor is the concept ‘Europe’ dependent upon a particular 
geographical boundary. 
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metaphysics.22  Consider again the Nietzsche-Heraclitus relation.  Like Heidegger 
after him, Nietzsche drew inspiration from Heraclitus atavistically, as a nostalgic 
return to the sweet age before Socrates and metaphysics.23  Heidegger and 
Nietzsche celebrate Heraclitus’ supposed turn away from the business of the public 
sphere within Empire, and his withdrawal into the temple of Artemis for space to 
think.  Nietzsche writes:  
When Heraclitus withdrew into the courtyards and colonnades of the 
great temple of Artemis, this was a worthier ‘desert’ [than we may 
find today], I admit: why do we lack such temples? […] That which 
Heraclitus avoided, however, is still the same as that which we shun 
today: the noise and democratic chatter of the Ephesians, their 
politics, their latest news of the ‘Empire’ (the Persian, you 
understand), their market business of ‘today’ – for we philosophers 
need to be spared one thing above all: everything to do with ‘today.’ 
(1967 [1887], 109) 
Here we may find strong parallels to Heidegger’s celebration of Heraclitus as a 
thinker in the wilderness (1961 [1953]; 1975 [1954]) as well as his condemnation 
in Being and Time of chatter, ‘average everydayness’, and the market (1996 
[1927]).  Nietzsche and Heidegger, in other words, find inspiration in Heraclitus’ 
thought partly for its spatiality, because they admire his departure from the clamor 
of the polis.  There is of course another geographical dimension here.  Heraclitus 
was not ‘European’, except that Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger place him – in 
different respects – at the head of the great European tradition.  To repeat: it is 
futile to deny the connection between the Nietzsche-Heraclitus itinerary and the 
production of ‘European’ philosophy as a self-narrating, exclusionary, disciplinary 
tradition.   
 Following Spivak, I have called these ‘postcolonial’ guidelines.  But 
reading the Marxist philosopher Kojin Karatani (2003), we could equally call these 
transcritical.  Consider Karatani’s argument about Heraclitus’ space of thought – 
entering where he discusses the merits of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes’ 
conception of spatiality and the subject in Being and Time (1996 [1927]): 
[I]n criticizing Descartes, Heidegger [like Nietzsche] returned to the 
pre-Socratics.  To be kept always in mind, however, is the fact that 
these thinkers were foreigners to Athens.  Being in the Mediterranean 
space of intercourse, they thought in the interstices, or intermundia – 
to use Marx’s favorite term from Epicurus.  They did not depart from 
                                                 
22 This is how I interpret the work of Derrida and Spivak. 
23 For evidence of Nietzsche’s atavism for the pre-Socratics generally, and Heraclitus in particular, see fragments 
419 and 437 of The Will to Power (1968). 
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any polis as the self-evident premise of their thinking.  Parmenides, 
for instance, defied the Gods, and Heraclitus rebuked community 
rituals. … Although it was the center of politics and information, 
Athens was initially less developed with respect to thinking than 
were the margins of the Greek world.  The people of the Athenian 
community, who were enjoying their politico-economic hegemony, 
suddenly experienced an inundation of the paradoxa of previously 
unknown thinkers. (Karatani, 2003, 98) 
What we blithely speak of today as ‘Western philosophy’ thus was not created in 
Athens, or anywhere else in ‘Europe’.  Not only because Europe did not exist in 
Heraclitus’ time.  Rather because what we think of as ‘Western philosophy’ 
emerges, continues to emerge, through the turbid “inundation” – the flux – of a 
torrent of thought that transforms as it flows.  This flux did not begin within 
‘Europe’; nor did it begin ‘outside’ it, for no such boundary existed.  Nor does it 
today, but differently again.  
 So one could define the geography of the Heraclitus-Athenian engagement 
by the Aegean Sea under Greek hegemony.  Yet, as Karatani argues: “[r]ather than 
thinking in the space of a community gathered around a univocal set of rules,” the 
thought of Heraclitus emerges within “a heterogeneous space of intermundial 
intercourse” (2003, 99).  Heraclitus thought not in Europe, nor outside, but 
otherwise and elsewhere. 
 Perhaps we may say the same for Nietzsche – the one that follows 
Heraclitus in destroying the real world.  This would be a generous reading, one that 
desired to affirm the Nietzsche who wrote: “No limit to the ways in which the 
world can be interpreted” (1967 [1888], 326).  Very well.  Be generous.  A 
postcolonial, transcritical geography should aim to generate new and useful 
readings. 
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